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Bereft of the illusion of an epistemic vantage point external to science, what
should be our commitment towards the categories, concepts and terms of that
very science? Should we, despaired of the possibility to found these concepts on
rock bottom, adopt empiricist skepticism? Or perhaps the inexistence of exter-
nal foundations implies, rather, immunity for scientic ontology from
epistemological criticism? Philosophy’s “realism debate” died out without
providing a satisfactory answer to the dilemma, which was taken over by the
neighboring disciplines. The “symmetry principle” of the “Strong Programme”
for the sociology of science-the requirement that truth and error receive the
same kind of causal explanations-offered one bold metaphysical answer, un-
der the guise of a methodological decree. Recently, however, it has been argued
that this solution is not bold enough, that the social constructivists replaced
the naïve presumption of an independent nature which adjudicates our beliefs
with a mirror-image presumption of a sui generis society which furnishes
these beliefs autonomously. The proper metaphysics for a foundationless episte-
mology, argues Bruno Latour, is one which grants nature and society, object
and subject, equal roles in the success and failure of science and technology;
one in which history of society merges with a history of things-in-themselves.
The paper analyzes the philosophical and methodological motivations and
ramications of this extraordinary suggestion.
No Foundations
After taking central stage in the 1980s, the realism debate seems to have
subsided in recent years without leaving much of a mark. Given the grav-
ity of the issues at stake, a future historian of philosophy may nd herself
intrigued by this quick dissolution. The debate, after all, was an attempt
to accommodate an extremely important realization: that we do not have
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an independent perspective from which to view and adjudicate our knowl-
edge; no neutral language to talk about both nature and its representa-
tions. All the various arguments and positions in the debate, our imagined
historian would explain, were attempts at answers to one fundamental
question: bereft of the illusion of an epistemic vantage point external to
science, what should be our commitment towards the categories, concepts
and terms of that same science? Should we, despaired of the possibility to
found these concepts on rock bottom, adopt empiricist skepticism? Or,
perhaps the inexistence of external foundations implies, rather, immunity
for scientic ontology from such epistemological criticism? The realism
debate was quick to lose its vivacity, she might conclude, because, as many
of its participants noticed (Rescher 1987, p. xi), it had turned “technical”
before coming to grips with this basic dilemma. Philosophy, it seems, has
adopted realism as its ofcial stance on science while hardly noticing that
it has chosen, ipso facto, the latter of the two alternatives and without
reecting upon the metaphysical and epistemological ramications of this
choice.
In particular, realism’s quick ascendance to the throne of mainstream
philosophy of science—driving the incumbent, logical positivism, out of
its last strongholds—has obscured the fact that the title “realist” stood for
two completely different philosophical personae. The one, represented by,
e.g., Wright (1986), Harré (1986), Rescher (1987), Musgrave (in Nola
1988) and Putnam (1987), perceived the above dilemma as a reenactment
of the old philosophical struggle with the skeptic, who has simply taken
on a small array of new guises—anti-realist about this aspect of science or
the other. The other persona, assumed by the likes of Rorty (1979),
Hacking (1983), McDowell (1994) and Putnam of “The Meaning of
Meaning,” was engaged, to varying degrees of reection and success, in a
ground-breaking project of dismantling the very opposition in which the
former type of “realist” was taking a side. Taking their key from previous
assaults on the sets of dichotomies and hierarchies dening the Philosoph-
ical Kingdom of the battered positivist sovereign—Sellars on the “myth
of the given,” Quine on the dichotomy between “analytic” and “syn-
thetic,” Davidson on that between “scheme” and “content”—they set a
devastating challenge to what Rorty called “the visual metaphors of
knowledge,” and Hacking, following Dewey, summarized as “the specta-
tor theory of knowledge.”
The realism debate subsided, but the absence of an Archimedean sup-
port for science has lost none of its epistemological signicance, and that
fundamental dilemma, left unresolved by philosophy, has come to haunt
the neighboring disciplines of history and sociology of science. Indeed, the
students of these disciplines did not originally experience the philosophi-
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cal ight from foundationalism as a cause for concern but rather as a liber-
ating breakthrough. The manifestos of the Edinburgh School in the
mid-1970s were celebrations of this liberation.1 Provoking as much angry
opposition as enthusiastic application, the “social constructivism” evoked
by the self-titled “Strong Programme for the Sociology of Science” became
the liveliest and most fertile eld for the study of science in the last quar-
ter-century. It did so by holding on to both horns of the dilemma: insist-
ing on its own scientic merit—thus upholding science’s claim to unique
epistemic status—while denying science (including the sociology of sci-
ence itself ) any privileged realm—any autonomous epistemic dominion
where reasons rule over causes. In the name of the scientic values of empir-
icism, objectivity and generality, the Strong Programme demanded for it-
self the right (and assumed the responsibility) to provide causal accounts
for the essential core of scientic knowledge as well as its paraphernalia
(belying, in the process, the very distinction between core and periphery),
for its content as well as its institutions, and most importantly for its true
claims as well as its erroneous hypotheses and speculations. These accounts
were to be sociological—scientic knowledge is a social phenomenon, ar-
gued Bloor, Barnes, and their disciples against the solipsistic instincts of
most of modern epistemology. But it was the “symmetry principle”—the
requirement that truth and error receive the same kind of causal explana-
tions—that has turned the Sociology of Scientic Knowledge into a
strong philosophical position—a genuine “Empirical Program of Relativ-
ism (EPOR)”.2
2. Symmetry
To be a constructivist—social or otherwise—is to perceive the symmetry
principle as reecting a profound epistemological and metaphysical in-
sight: that human knowledge is fundamentally a human product, con-
structed by human agency out of malleable, though recalcitrant natural
ingredients. According to the constructivist credo, it is not unmediated
Nature that distinguishes between true and false claims. Humans make
the distinction, by applying historically changing and culturally depend-
ent criteria. From this point of view there is clearly no place for two differ-
ent types of historical, sociological or philosophical accounts of science;
one—internal and rational—for its successes, and the other—external and
causal—for failures.
This is a very powerful philosophical position, but it is not where the
symmetry principle displays its true force. The demand for symmetrical
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1. Perhaps the most exemplary ones are Bloor’s (1976) and Barnes’ (1977).
2. Collins (1981)
causal accounts of true and false science still presents an intriguing chal-
lenge to the philosophy of science precisely because it can be coached and
supported in strictly methodological terms, committing, as it were, to no
metaphysical creed but that implied directly by the “scientic method” it-
self.3 One does not need to accept any assumptions regarding the nature of
scientic truth in order to accept the symmetry principle; it is a straight-
forward application of the scientic edicts of causality, generality, parsi-
mony and, especially, objectivity.
This is so because even a staunch believer in the existence of a province
of scientic knowledge that gains its legitimacy directly from nature, an
autarchic “realm of reasons”4 unfettered by causes, will nd it hard to in-
sist that we know the boundaries of this domain. Even Lakato himself
would have had to concede, it seems, that we do not know the real pedi-
gree of our beliefs: we do not know which of them were conceived and
bred by reasons within the realm and which by causes outside it. The un-
perturbed Lakatoian would be right to point out that to accept a knowl-
edge claim as scientic, let alone as true, is to grant the credibility of its
lineage, and would also probably argue, against the constructivist, that
this credibility means that the claim was reasoned rather than caused. But,
he will surely admit, a station within the realm of reasons is always as ten-
tative and provisional as any other attribute we assign to a scientic claim.
The realization that we do not have an independent point on which to
found the truth of our knowledge applies just as well to its rationality. All
one can say, in that respect, about the most reliable and trustworthy pieces
of current science, is precisely that: that they represent the best knowledge
we have, probably the best we ever had, and perhaps the best we could
hope for; or, similarly, that they are supported by the best, purest reasons
we could come up with.
This, one should stress, is quite a lot. It should be enough to defeat the
skeptic: if there is no rm, independent standing point from which to
ascertain that our scientic convictions are reasoned and true, there can
also be no independent position from which they can be shown as funda-
mentally wrong or irrational.5 But the reliability and trustworthiness of
these convictions is not nearly enough to censure the question of how
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3. See, e.g., Golinsky 1998, pp. 6, 8.
4. This is the phrase developedby Sellars in his 1956, granted in a much more sophisti-
cated way than can be discussed here.
5. This argument does not effect anyone’s entitlement to offer external criticism of the
morality, political standing, nancial cost, cultural implications or any other aspect of sci-
ence. Science’s relative immunity, according to this line of thought, is limited to its
epistemic prowess. That, again, is not due to science’s own unshakeable foundations,but to
the impossibility of any such foundations.
we did establish them, nor any well-supported answer to this question—
notwithstanding that both question and answer may trespass the bound-
aries marked and declared by scientists, the legitimate inhabitants of
the alleged domain of pure reasons. In other words: if our assumptions
about the nature of scientic truth preclude the possibility that a scientic
claim may be both caused and true (assumptions rejected by the social
constructivist), we might not like to discover that some or all of our
beliefs are an effect of “external” causes. Even if we were shown a convinc-
ing causal account of their emergence and acceptance, we may decide to
reserve judgment about whether or not to keep holding to those beliefs.
But we cannot preclude the possibility of such an account concerning any
particular belief.
Thus, not knowing in advance which of our scientic convictions right-
fully belongs in the touted realm of reasons, it is scientic objectivity it-
self that demands of the investigator of science to treat all of them alike.
The historian, sociologist, or philosopher of science should put aside her
own (probably favorite) opinion concerning the truth of the claims made
by scientists. And unless she believes, against strong evidence to the con-
trary, that “truth prevails”—that the very truth of a claim, scientic or
other, guarantees that it will ultimately be recognized as such—this de-
mand will not strike her as a difcult one to meet. If she is interested in
Einstein’s path to relativity theory and the means by which he swayed his
peers into accepting it, how could she benet from her own knowledge
that the theory was correct? Assuming, as we do, that she has no recourse
to an external vantage point from which to examine both Einstein’s hy-
potheses and their independent “truth of the matter,” we must conclude
that she based her conviction upon Einstein’s own success in convincing
himself and his peers. But this success is exactly what she attempts to ac-
count for; it cannot be used as part of the explanation. Hence, when one
gives up the uplifting but ill-founded belief in revelation—in the mysti-
cal property of truth to declare itself to the unobstructed gaze of the hu-
man mind—symmetry becomes a simple consequence of scientic parsi-
mony. If the truth of an hypothesis is not to be employed in the account of
its emergence and acceptance, than there is no reason to eld two essen-
tially different kinds of explanations; one for true science and the other for
false.
This is only one way to spell out the requirement of symmetry in expla-
nation. It is somewhat less exciting than the epistemological version I
summarized above, but it has one important advantage. It helps to illus-
trate that, in complete opposition to its prevalent “anti-science” image,
social constructivism tends to behave very much like its great punching
bag—good old logical positivism—purporting to be a metaphysics-free
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methodological critique. And in a vain much similar to the disillusion-
ment suffered by that previous attempt at scientic philosophy, the
condent methodological decrees of the Strong Programme, their struc-
ture thoroughly explored by their most competent upholders, gave way to
painful metaphysical dilemmas. In fairness to the Strong Programme, it
should be noted that the dilemmas were raised against the background
of signicant empirical success, which denitely redeems the methodolog-
ical self-understanding. Moreover, these dilemmas were given their most
pungent formulation by one of the scholars most responsible for its suc-
cess—Bruno Latour.
3. Super Symmetry
Latour never shied away from metaphysical commitments, especially those
implied by the constructivist approach to knowledge. All epistemological
dichotomies, a-symmetries and hierarchies, he happily contends, are con-
structions. This is true, he species, of the superiority of Western science
over any other mode of knowledge, and of course true of the distinction
between “internal” reasons and “external” causes of belief, as the Strong
Programme prociently argued. This fact itself does not make a-symme-
tries like these any less “real”; science’s superiority, one recalls, was force-
fully upheld by the advocates of the Strong Programme, while the exter-
nal-internal distinction, Latour had already shown in his Laboratory Life, is
an important argumentation tool in the hands of scientists. The con-
structed nature of a-symmetries does mean, however, that one is not
obliged to adopt any of them—they should rather be treated as a subject
matter for analysis; “topicalized,” in the internal lingo of the debate. In
requiring exactly this, under the principle of symmetry, the Strong
Programme has been a genuine intellectual revolution. Insisting that both
truth and error are outcomes of social negotiation, the social con-
structivists demonstrated how the establishment of even this most basic
dichotomy occurred differently and locally each time anew. They thus all
but obliterated the most sanctied a-symmetry of traditional epistemol-
ogy, namely, the custom of assigning truth to nature and error to society.
But the Edinburgh revolution cannot be the last, insists Latour. The
social constructivists, he proclaims, stopped short of committing them-
selves to the historization of all a-symmetries. Assaulting the a-symmetri-
cal preference to nature, they ended up replacing it with a similar prefer-
ence to society. Insisting that the former is a construct, they found
themselves accepting the latter as a sui generis, autarchic entity.6 Wran-
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6. A similar accusation is levelled at the philosopher most commonly associated—not
necessarily to his liking—with social constructivism, Richard Rorty. Richard Bernstein
gling with the custom of assigning exclusively to Nature the positive role
of begetting truth, and to society the negative role of introducing error,
the social constructivists fell into the habit of allocating to society every
active move in the production of knowledge and leaving Nature with
only, at best, the passive role of recalcitrance. Finally, choosing society over
Nature, but remaining within the boundaries of the dichotomy between
the two, they again found themselves unwittingly mimicking their posi-
tivist arch-rivals: having to allow human agents the freedom to construct
their knowledge according to social forces, they were inclined to watch as
“[Nature] ‘itself’ drops out of the story” (ibid.). They did this by reconsti-
tuting the archaic notion of a neutral observation; a realm of consensus,
where all observers agree upon the presence of a “redish powdery sub-
stance” (Bloor 1999, p. 93) in front of them.
Yet, there is no more basis for this new a-symmetry, which favors soci-
ety to Nature, than for the old one, where Nature was preferred. The very
dichotomy between Nature and society is a construct. The sharp distinc-
tion between subjects and objects, claims Latour, between human-societal
and objective-natural, is but another articial a-symmetry, constructed
philosophically and politically in the seventeenth century—as beautifully
shown in one of the classics of the school, Leviathan and the Air Pump
(Shapin and Schaffer 1985). Therefore this dichotomy, and especially its
boundaries, should not be taken for granted; there is no point in replacing
naïve realism—the belief that Nature is “out there,” independently of
what humans make of it—with naïve sociologism—the belief that society
is simply “in us,” independently of what Nature enforces on it.
With that Latour calls upon the next revolution, establishing a “super-
symmetry”7 (my term) between subjects and objects in place of the local
symmetry between truth and error. How can we do this? Well, by letting
objects, as it were, “speak for themselves”; by allowing them to participate
as equal partners in the stories of the successes and failures of science and
technology—and, for that matter, society as well. The Copernican Revolu-
tion did not belong solely to Copernicus, Tycho, Kepler and Galileo. The
planets, comets and super-novae had no less of a role in it, and the rapid
social changes that followed the casting of Earth into the margins of
heaven and setting it in triple motion should be ascribed to all those rele-
vant agents—history of society cannot be separated from the history of
things-in-themselves.
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claims that if in Rorty’s mind “social practices are the sort of thing that are given, and that
all we need to do is to look and see what they are,” then he “himself is guilty of a version of
the ‘Myth of the Given’” (Bernstein, 1985, p. 83).
7. Collins and Yearly mark the idea “hyper symmetry.” See their 1992 and Collins
1994.
4. Latour’s Dilemma
This is an exciting specter, and Latour attempts to carry it through in his
remarkably wide-ranging work. He seems to get closest to his historio-
graphic ideal in Aramis (Latour 1996). Yet the great allure of this position
cannot disguise its immense difculty, for which he has received sharp
criticism by his erstwhile comrades, most notably Collins and Yearly
(1992) and Bloor (1999).
Both the allure and the difculties are well demonstrated in Latour’s
programmatic contribution to Daston (2000, pp. 247…269). Referring to
an episode on which his expertise needs no further testimony, he turns our
attention to the debate between Pouchet, the last “legitimate” champion
of spontaneous generation, and Pasteur, one of the original two masters
(Koch being the other) of germ theory. It will not do, explains Latour, to
treat Pouchet as hopelessly pursuing an entity that has never existed any-
where, while Pasteur is playing hide and seek with real entities, which
have always been everywhere. Such a “demarcating” attitude only masks
the actual discrepancy between the two. The warm and fuzzy blanket of
these seemingly-obvious categories—”real” vs. “unreal”—would com-
pletely blur the intricate differences in the theoretical, experimental, in-
stitutional, political and technical associations by which both men were
trying to envelope their competing phenomena in order to bring them
into stable and secure existence. Moreover; it will mask the hard labor
which Pasteur had to put in, in order to extend the existence of germs
from his laboratory towards the always and everywhere. But it would be
only marginally better to look at the two as employing an array of human
resources—theories, prejudices, political loyalties and bodily skills—to
create consensus concerning “dramatically underdetermined matters of
fact” (p. 264). This would mean that “matters of fact [are] playing no role
at all in the controversy human agents have about them” (ibid.)—the exact
mirror image of the discarded demarcation. Both approaches are radically
a-symmetrical, pitting humans in their ever-changing society to objects in
their never changing Nature.
Yet, what exactly does it mean to let “matters of fact [play] a role” in
the closure of the dispute between Pasteur and Pouchet? How are we sup-
posed to let “things-in-themselves” tell their own version of Pasteur’s win-
ning the day? Even the most rudimentary attempt to explore the
signicance of Latour’s beautiful phrase is bound to come up against that
primary philosophical insight with which we started: we know no other
way of listening to “matters of fact” but through science. In order to
achieve super-symmetry, it appears, in order to let objects fulll historical
roles similar to subjects, we must refer to science in the attempt to recount
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history—science’s own history included. It may seem somewhat petty to
waive the ag of petitio principii here; admittedly, the “recount” we are
seeking is not an abstract argument, but a causal-historical narrative. But
the difculty this petitio principii signals is not merely logical. If, contrary
to the old constructivists, we are to give Pasteur’s germs their fair share in
his success to ll our world with industrial yogurt and antibiotics, how are
we to avoid prejudging his dispute with Pouchet in his favor? After all,
that was exactly Pasteur’s claim—namely, that the success of his
prize-winning experiments was due to germs; that germs were responsible
for fermentation and putrefaction.
The difculty of Latour’s position, the price paid for the next revolu-
tion, is steep, and is to be delivered in hard metaphysical currency. In or-
der to secure the symmetry between things and people, between germs
and Pasteur, it appears, Latour has to sacrice the cherished and
hard-earned symmetry of SSK—the one between truth and falsehood, be-
tween germs and spontaneous generation. If we were to grant Pasteur’s
germs with historical agency, then the requirement of symmetry would
force us to ascribe the same agency to Pouchet’s spontaneously generated
eggs. It is hard to believe that even the most devout of constructivists
would approve of granting agency to non-existing entities. Yet giving up
on symmetry is renouncing the most signicant philosophical achieve-
ment of the Strong Programme: the empirically supported claim that es-
tablished science is a contingent creation, one of a variety of possible prod-
ucts of social negotiations. To wit: if the reasons for Pasteur’s success are
different from the causes for Pouchet’s failure, if Pasteur won the dispute
because he had germs on his side, then the die was cast in his favor from
the outset; the conclusion of their dispute was predetermined by nature
rather than contingent upon human labor.
Contingency is the strong metaphysical commitment behind the sym-
metry principle, a commitment disguised earlier by presenting symmetry
as a metaphysics-free methodological ploy. Without contingency, there is
no constructivism, social or other: if humans construct knowledge using
natural materials, it must be no more necessary than any other human
construct; any other artifact.8 Yet from the point of view of science—
the perspective that Latour’s new demands appear to force upon us—this
same knowledge looks anything but contingent. This is exactly how
it should be; it is the business of scientists to make their claims and results
appear as necessary and inevitable as they possibly can. It is the business
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8. Hacking (1999) makes “contingency” one of his three marks of constructivism, to-
gether with nominalism and external explanations of stability. C.f. Ch. 3, pp. 63…99.
of historians, philosophers and sociologists to trace their contingency.
This difference in epistemic commitments and interests can—but does
not have to—develop into epistemological difference, and it did—as
it should not have—develop into the political quagmire known as “the
science wars,” but it is a genuine difference even without such develop-
ments. It is hard to see how one can hold to both perspectives at once, how
one can maintain “internal realism” simultaneously with “empirical rela-
tivism.”
5. The Case of Newton’s Optics
It would perhaps be better to understand and judge the dilemma brought
about by Latour’s critique against the backdrop of real historiographic
debate, rather than his made-for-the-occasion examples. Competing hist-
oriographic narratives of one and the same episode are almost as hard to
nd as a replication of an experiment, but the signicance of the debate is
such that Alan Shapiro, a distinguished historian of Newtonian science, in
an explicit attempt to lay bare the constructivist folly, wrote in 1996
a massive recount of the introduction and acceptance of Newton’s op-
tics—for which Simon Schaffer had suggested a detailed constructivist ac-
count of just a few years earlier (Shaffer 1989). The two papers, brilliant
pieces of scholarship in their competing approaches, are exciting enough
to compare as they stand. Reviewed from the perspective of Latour’s
dilemma, the dispute between them becomes almost unsettling.
Most of the basic chapters of the episode are not under contention.
Sometime during the academic year 1666, while working on improving
optical instruments, Isaac Newton, then an undergraduate student at
Cambridge, concluded that the elongated spectrum, cast by a light ray re-
fracted through a prism on a screen 20…22 feet removed, was not an arti-
fact of an asymmetrically placed prism, but rather a genuine effect of the
nature of light. A long series of experiments followed, and a remarkable
“New Theory of Light and Colour” ensued. According to this theory, the
white sunlight surrounding us is not simple, but rather a mixture of prim-
itive rays, each characterized by a unique color and a unique index of
refrangibility. Refraction did not modify light in creating the colors of the
rainbow, but rather broke it down to its primitive constituents.
After presentation at a lecture course in Cambridge, the theory was
submitted to the Royal Society of London in 1672, in a letter that cited
only three experiments. The most celebrated of them—the so called
experimentum crucis—involved a second refraction, to demonstrate that the
rst refraction did not, indeed, modify the characteristics of white light,
but rather exposed the real and immutable properties of primary rays,
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properties which persevered through the second refraction.9 The theory
was rst enthusiastically endorsed, but the resistance, which started to
mount from both Britain and the continent, pushed Newton into angry
withdrawal from public scientic life until the 1680s. The resistance,
however, waned; by 1704, when Newton published his Optics, it was re-
ceived almost unanimously, and the little debate that did arise was rmly
settled in Newton’s favor. “After 1726 or 1728 . . . to oppose [Newton’s
theory] was to initiate being removed from the mainstream of the
scientic community,” claims Shapiro (1996, p. 125). Schaffer disagrees
on the dates: “The 1740s saw important . . . specic criticisms of some of
Newton’s apparent claims” (1989, p. 99), he points out, but he does agree
that: “In popular texts such as Voltaire’s Elements of Sir Isaac Newton’s Phi-
losophy (1738) and Algarotti’s Newtonianism for Ladies (1737) it was
claimed that those who had not succeeded in replicating Newton’s trials
‘had not been happy enough in the Choice of . . . prisms’” (pp. 91…2).
This is more or less where the agreement between the two historians
ends. Their differences on the question of why and how Newton’s theory
was accepted, an afterthought issue for historians of previous generations,
runs so deep that it colors every other aspect of their respective accounts.
Why did Newton, for example, offer only three experiments in the paper
submitted to the Royal Society? Was this deviation from the experi-
mentalism ponticated by the Society a simple stylistic mistake, which
caused him to lose points with its gentlemen members, as offered by
Shapiro, or a sophisticated rhetorical ploy, intended to highlight his
experimentum crucis and provide it with emblematic status, as Schaffer
claims? And what did Newton intend the experimentum crucis to demon-
strate? Was it the immutability of colors, as most of his contemporaries
seem to have assumed, or the different and constant refrangibility of each
colored ray, as Shapiro explains? Or did Newton himself, as Schaffer sug-
gests, change his interpretation in order to defeat recalcitrant opponents?
What, in general, was the degree of such recalcitrance? Was Newton’s ex-
perimental “authority . . . necessarily unstable and contested” even well af-
ter his death and near-deication (Schaffer 1989, p. 100), or is it that
“Schaffer, as a constructivist, focuses almost exclusively on controversy”
since it allows him to “make it appear that Newton’s theory was continu-
ally contested” while in fact “focusing on Newton’s critics” is a vicious
constructivist bias, which “tells us little about his supporters” and “easily
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9. Whether the properties demonstrated were the unique colors or the unique indices
of refrangibility was importantly disputed, and still is among the involved historians. I
will return to this dispute momentarily.
distorts the historical picture” by “reducing the issue of acceptance to one
of power and authority” (Shapiro 1996, pp. 60…2)? And what did, in fact,
determine the conclusion of Newton’s debates, especially the ones with
that group of English Jesuits from Liège? Did the scientic community
arrive reasonably at the conclusion that being the last ones to still report
failure to replicate Newton’s not-too-complicated experiments, the Jesuits
were simply incompetent (Shapiro)? Or did Newton succeeded in
marginalizing the group, which stubbornly deed the success of his exper-
iments and their interpretation, by controlling the rules of the debate,
constantly changing the signicance of the experimental set-up, dictating
the interpretation of the results and de-legitimizing their claims
(Schaffer)?
Until recently, any student of science with basic sympathy to con-
structivism could have easily pointed out the misunderstandings from
which stems Shapiro’s criticism of Schaffer. To begin with, Shapiro’s no-
tions of “power and authority” are limited to brute power and repressive
authority, gathered by “conspirators” and distributed to “acolytes” (p. 60).
Needless to say, no constructivist for whom the name “Foucault” rings re-
motely familiar would grant that these are the only relations holding be-
tween power and knowledge. More signicant still, is that Shapiro con-
stantly favors the winners; where Newton “explains,” the Jesuits “insist”
(p. 77); where Newton’s critics “fail to replicate,” his supporters “elide
difculties” (p. 94). And Shapiro’s most signicant failure, from the tradi-
tional constructivist perspective, is in seeing reasons where he should have
seen effects; in nding explanations for Newton’s success where he should
have located the mysteries of that success. Thus, he explains with the
Newtonians why Venetian glass was inadequate for replicating Newton’s
experiments, instead of accounting for the Newtonians’ success in ascrib-
ing every failure in replication to the (low) quality of the equipment or the
(lack of ) skills of the experimenters. This, the constructivist would be
quick to point out, is exactly the dilemma facing the experimenter:
whether to attribute the failure of his experiment to the inadequacy of his
equipment or to that of the inspected theory.10 The eighteenth century
scientic community could have taken the fact that Newton’s experiments
could not be replicated “with Venetian glass, long considered Europe’s
best” (p. 128) as a refutation of Newtonian optics, or it could have ac-
cepted Dereham and Desaguliers’ arguments that the failure was due to
bad prisms; it decided to do the latter. Instead of explaining why
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10. This is the dillema Collins carefully inspects in his 1985 under the title “The
Experimenter’s Regress.”
(“topicalizing” the episode, in the common Edinburgh dialect), Shapiro
adopts the Newtonians’ arguments.
However, Latour’s comments shatter the constructivists’ condence. To
ascribe the “gradual acceptance of Newton’s theory” solely to the negotiat-
ing skills of Newton and his allies, he explains, is almost as bad as ascrib-
ing it directly to Nature. If, in the name of symmetry, Newton’s “insis-
tence” on his interpretation of his results should receive the same
treatment as the Liège group’s “explanation” of theirs, then, in the name of
symmetry, differently refrangible colored rays should get as much credit for
establishing Newton’s authority as he and his authority get in establishing
their existence and signicance. Could this be done without adjudicating
the dispute by its results? This is the dilemma I named after Latour.
6. Back to Realism?
So, is Latour’s dilemma not, after all, just another stance in the realism de-
bate? It is, denitely, a worry very similar to the ones that sparked that de-
bate, namely: How do we settle our loss of epistemological innocence with
our acknowledgement of the indispensability of scientic ontology? What
is the proper metaphysical commitment to a science that is both unique
and contingent? One way to understand realism along the lines I sketched
at the beginning, is to view it as an attempt to answer this challenge
by falling on the ontological side: “when we say, and mean, that such-
and-such is the case, we—and our meaning—do not stop anywhere short
of the fact; but we mean: this—is—so” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investi-
gations §95; cf. McDowell 1994, pp. 26…29). Epistemologically, this
choice implied a thorough rejection of all attempts—positivist, instru-
mentalist and all their nuanced variations—to hold in media res; to believe
science on a tentative basis while denying its categories the status they
aspire to.11 Such unabashed adoption of scientic ontology, it seems, is ex-
actly what Latour requires to resolve his dilemma. If the use of non-
scientic arguments supports the use of scientic ontology—if one can
justify employing scientic concepts without referring to the reasons
adduced by the scientists under investigation—then Latour should be al-
lowed to bring these concepts into his accounts of science. Might realism,
the destructor of the previous “methodological philosophy,” logical posi-
tivism, come to the rescue of the current one, social constructivism?
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11. It is important to recall that although the title “realism” for this position is rela-
tively new, the position and arguments for it are not. One early version of them is Galileo’s
rejection of Cardinal Belarmine’s suggestion that he (Galileo) should adopt what we would
call an instrumentalist approach towards Copernicanism. See “Galileo’s Considerations on
the Copernican Opinion” in Finocchiaro 1989, pp. 70…86.
Certainly, not every self-styled realist would conceive of constructivism
after Latour as requiring—or even deserving—a rescue. I introduced real-
istic thought as consisting of two strands: the anti-skeptic and the
anti-representational. For thinkers of the former ilk, Latour’s move did not
appear to suggest any dilemma. Rather, they viewed it as a welcome so-
bering-up; a commendable retreat from fanciful constructive epistemol-
ogy and a return to the good old “idea that experiment and debate allow
science to home in on the true mechanisms behind the appearances”
(Papineau 1995, p. 491).12 The worry of old constructivist avant-garde,
best voiced by Bloor (1999), that Latour’s further revolution is nothing
but a counter-revolution, echoes the realist hope that Latour “is inching
his way towards common sense” (Papineau 1995), instigating Latour’s
rant that: “the acquiescence of the two archenemies, social constructivists
and realists, to the very same metaphysics for opposed reasons has always
been for me a source of some merriment” (Latour 2000, p. 264). To those
who believe that “beliefs should be caused by the facts they are about”
(Papineau 1987, p. xiv), Latour may seem to present no dilemma, as the
principle of symmetry presented no achievement, and its abandonment is
therefore no loss.
But the realist sigh of relief is premature. The anti-relativist realist can-
not, to be sure, tolerate the relativism that seems to stem from the strong
metaphysical reading of the symmetry principle offered by Latour. She
does, however, have a vested interest in the original, methodological ver-
sion of the principle, for reasons akin to the ones with which I introduced
this version. Anti-relativism becomes scientic realism once the trust in
scientic criteria, procedures, techniques etc.—the (anti-relativist) belief
in their efcacy to pick true scientic statements from false ones—is sup-
ported by the (realist) conviction in the objectivity of scientic state-
ments—in their gaining their subject matter and their truth from the ob-
jects of which they are about.13 When the realist urges us to trust the
objectivity of science, she vouches her trust in the hope that these criteria,
procedures etc. are able to sort through scientic statements to the objects
that give them their truth and meaning. If the criteria and procedures
contain biases, if they prejudge scientic hypotheses, then they are ipso
facto not objective—they do not allow the objects to adjudicate the truth
of statements. The symmetry principle is nothing but a demand for objec-
tivity in this very sense, applied to the study of science itself—a demand
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12. This citation is from Papineau’s review of Pickering (1995), which is an
attempt—far less successful, to my mind—in the same direction as Latour’s.
13. Anti-relativism can of course be supported in many other ways as well, e.g., by the
belief in a benevolent God or in evolutionarily-tested categories.
not to prejudge our hypotheses about the coming to being of scientic
statements by our knowledge of their truth. This demand is aided by an-
other fundamental element of the realist creed, namely that “defeat always
is a possibility where criteria are concerned [a]nd it will be in the lap of
the gods whether it occurs in any particular case” (Wright 1987, p. 279).
This fallibilism follows immediately from that most realistic of principles,
namely that truth transcends all evidence, and it means that we always
have to allow that we have been wrong to accept that any particular
scientic claim has “a ‘genuinely factual’ subject-matter” (Wright 1987,
p. 7). Thus, even if we are certain of the truth of a specic scientic asser-
tion and the falsehood of its rival, it is realism that commands us to treat
them symmetrically. It is realism that requires that we let the hypotheses
about the discovery and justication of true as well as false claims to
scientic knowledge be decided by the objects of inquiry, whether histori-
cal or sociological, without these hypotheses being prejudged by the truth
or falsehood of the claims.
Realism requires symmetry, and for the realist, the difculties arising
from this requirement should be a cause for concern rather than glee. If, as
Bloor ercely contends, his position is a realist, naturalist and materialist
one (e.g., 1999, pp. 87…91), then there is no apparent reason why the ar-
guments which Latour directs against this position could not be general-
ized to pertain to more conventional versions of realism. The difculties
raised by Latour concerning the Edinburgh way of interpreting and apply-
ing the symmetry principle—namely the unwitting consequent shift to-
wards idealism—are difculties shared by the realist. This is, indeed, the
major fault that Hillary Putnam nds in her position: “so far as the
commonsense world is concerned,” he concludes, “the effect of what is
called “realism” in philosophy is to deny objective reality, to make it all
simply thought” (1987, p. 12).14 The social idealism with which Latour
charges the Edinburgh school is different from the idealism to which
Putnam refers, but it is not different enough to avert the suspicion that if
Latour’s criticism of the Strong Programme is a move within the realism
debate, its signicance resides in pointing at an internal inconsistency
within the anti-skeptic realist position.
Even more troubling, from the perspective of anti-skeptic realism, is
the dilemma emerging from Latour’s attempt to replace the idealism he
recovers with realist intuitions—namely; that the success of this attempt
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14. In fact, Putnam’s conclusion is weaker than allowed by his argument, which dem-
onstrates that quite a few scientic properties beyond “the commonsense world” become a
product of “thought” when viewed from the perspective of the brand of scientic realism
he tags, after Husserl, “objectivism.”
apparently comes at the cost of the original symmetry. This is because
Latour’s dilemma is highly reminiscent of a familiar, nagging tension in
this version of realism: anti-skepticism is based on afrming and acclaim-
ing the success of contemporary science. But this success is predicated on
the failure of its predecessors, and the failure suggests that the success is
temporary and tentative, and thus no weapon against the skeptic. In
Latour’s case, it is the apparent discrepancy between the two realist inter-
pretations of symmetry—Bloor’s and Latour’s—which presents realism as
deconstructing itself. In anti-skepticism, it is the discrepancy between the
realist interpretation of contemporary success and the unattering
“meta-inductive” conclusion drawn from past failure. Again, the intellec-
tual motivations are very different, but the resultant worry is the same; re-
alists of the anti-skeptic camp should have an interest in a solution to
Latour’s dilemma, and their failure to as much as address it can rightly be
perceived by Latour and his disciples as another evidence for the poverty of
their approach.
7. A Possible Realist Resolution
But there is another brand of realism. Its subscribers are not always given
this title, since they do not usually make rm proclamations in favor of
mind-independent reality, truth-likeness of theories or unknowably-true
statements. This is not because they believe in the opposite doctrines, but
because they nd it hard to express themselves in terms of a gap between
mind and object. This deance makes those thinkers—some of whom I
mentioned above—less likely to take a position within the “realism de-
bate” as shaped in the 1980s, but I think it does warrant labeling them
“realists.” This is not the place to review the various attitudes that they
might develop towards Latour’s dilemma, but, by way of example, I will
try to distill such a possible position from one of their own to whom the
term “constructivist” can be applied with least violence—Ian Hacking.
In his recent Social Construction of What? (1999) Hacking offers a
less-than-favorable, if fair, critique of social constructivism in general and
its epistemological brand in particular (cf. his chapter 3, pp. 63…99), and
expresses surprise that his earlier Rewriting the Soul (Hacking, 1995) was
labeled “a classic of social constructionism” (1999, p. viii). Yet, in his still
earlier Representing and Intervening (Hacking 1983), he takes a leaf from the
constructist analyses of the preceding decade: “Traditionally scientists are
said to explain phenomena that they discover in nature. I say that often
they create the phenomena that then become the centerpieces of theory”
(Hacking 1983, p. 220).
Hacking’s adoption of this stance—now a constructivist commonplace,
then still a small philosophical rebellion—is signicant for our purposes
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here especially because it was formulated as an explicitly realist, anti-
positivist argument (the immediate target was van Fraassen 1980). I argue
in another place (2002, pp. 63…81) that Hacking’s fusion of constructiv-
ism and realism, captured nicely by his slogan “if you can spray them then
they are real” (Hacking 1983, p. 23), fails exactly where the framework of
the realism debate forces him to inadvertently revert to (what he himself
contemptuously names, after Dewey) “the spectator theory of Knowledge”
(p. 130). This very shortcoming is rather an advantage here; it allows us to
investigate how far one can proceed in solving Latour’s dilemma without
succumbing to Latour’s extraordinary demand that we completely aban-
don the distinction between Nature and our knowledge about this Nature.
A possible, admittedly indirect, resolution stems from Hacking’s thor-
oughly constructive analysis of microscopic observation: “you learn to see
through a microscope by doing, not just by looking” (p. 189). This, by
Hacking’s admission, is a reinstatement of Berkeley’s “Theory of Vision”:
“We see the tiny glass needle—a tool that we have ourselves crafted under
the microscope—jerk through the cell wall. We see the lipid oozing out of
the end of the needle as we gently turn the screw on a large, thoroughly
macroscopic plunger . . . John Dewey’s jeers at the ‘spectator theory of
knowledge’ are equally germane for the spectator theory of microscopy”
(p. 190).
This analysis is an important achievement for constructivism because it
applies the idea that “scientic knowledge is a human creation, made with
available material and cultural resources” (Golinsky 1998, p. 6) directly to
observation. Observation, needless to mention, has always been epistemol-
ogy’s leading metaphor, and within the empiricist tradition was always as-
sumed to be the fundamental level of knowledge acquisition. But if
knowledge is produced at its most basic and primitive level—that of direct
observation—then there is no more reason to worry about scientic con-
cepts than about everyday ones.
This seems to be the non-scientic support for the use of scientic
ontology that Latour requires in order to justify using scientic vocabu-
lary in explaining science. Hacking’s line of thought does not come close
to insuring that scientic concepts touch “things-in-themselves,” but it
does suggest that no other way of engaging with these “things” is doing a
better job. In other words: if we cannot be assured that in using scientic
vocabulary we are actually allowing “things-in-themselves” to participate
in “causal accounts” of science, at least we are advised that we have no real
choice. There is nothing in hands and microscopes, Hacking tells us,
which relates to nature in a more direct or a less problematic way than the
vocabulary of the participants, and if this vocabulary happened also to be
ours, then so be it. We have, we realized, only one science, and there is no
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external “epistemological” point of view from which to judge its epi-
stemic claims.
8. Tentative Conclusion
This authorization to follow Latour and remain an upright constructivist
may strike one as unsatisfactory specically because of its skeptical over-
tones, but it does highlight an important aspect of Latour’s dilemma.
Hacking’s brand of constructivism is anything but social. Entrenched as it
is in the traditional epistemology it sets out to challenge, it is personal
knowledge that Representing and Intervening is commonly arguing about,
and its examples and analyses are characteristically individualistic in
tone.15 The examples deal with the solitary observer, the single experi-
menter, the lone expert; rarely are the large systems of “big science” fa-
vored by constructivists, or even the whole laboratory explored by Latour,
even mentioned. This is a problematic approach not simply because it del-
egates the public aspect of science to someone else. Science, the social
constructivists taught, is public in essence. Theories, experiments, mathe-
matical demonstrations—all these claim and gain their epistemic author-
ity in the public realm, and cannot be reduced to the knowledge held pri-
vately by individual scientists.16 But like the previous failure I noted in
Hacking’s critique of epistemology, this one also has a clear advantage in
our context: by applying constructivism strictly and directly to the indi-
vidual, Hacking avoids the two pitfalls of social constructivism, which
Latour pointedly marked out: the assumption of a sui generis society; and
the assumption of free-for-all data.
From the social constructivist point of view, individualism is too steep
a price to pay, even if one gives heed to Latour’s complaint. The social
character of knowledge in general and science in particular; the principle
that “knowledge [is] whatever is collectively endorsed” and “knowledge is
better equated with culture than with experience” (Bloor 1976, pp. 3, 12)
is too basic a principle for the Strong Programme. It is more deeply en-
trenched, in fact, than the constructive principle—that knowledge is a
human product. Yet it is exactly this individualism that allows Hacking
to bring in the notion that knowledge is produced “all the way down”—to
direct observation—just as the need “to let society in” forced Bloor to as-
sume a level of agreed-by-all observation, one in which all individualist
constituents of the constructive epistemology—skills, expertise, com-
mand of instruments—are neutralized, and elementary consensus can be
established (see above).
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15. As cited above, Rewriting the Soul (Hacking 1995) is markedly different in that
respect.
16. The most elaborate case for this claim is made by Shapin (1994).
This line of reasoning suggests that Latour’s dilemma may be founded
on an unexpected conict between “social” and “constructivism” in their
original coupling. The (not necessarily social) constructivist claim that the
agency involved in creating knowledge is human, rather than Nature’s, is a
direct assault against the dichotomy between the knowing human and the
known Nature. The claim also aims against the sharp distinction between
individual and society. To wit, the traditional solipsistic puzzles proceed
from assuming Man’s detachment from objects to worrying about his
loneliness amongst his fellow humans, and constructivism eschews both
assumption and worry. The social (but in fact not necessarily) construct-
ivist claim that knowledge is a social entity, on the other hand, creates a
strong stake in preserving and strengthening the individual-society di-
chotomy. Thus, by the same token, it provides a prop for the knower-
Nature one. The dichotomy between “individual experience” on the one
hand, and the “collective vision or visions of reality” which “society fur-
nishes” on the other (Bloor 1976, p. 12) is dependent upon “sustaining
the distinction between subject and object, . . . driving a wedge between
nature itself and the descriptions of it” (Bloor 1999, p. 94). Since for
the adherents of the Strong Programme it was society, with its groups, in-
stitutions, interests and practices, which was to provide our knowledge
with structure—”stability [of inductive generalizations] is the stability of
forms of life or taken-for-granted-practices” (Collins 1985, p. 18)—the
“wedge” was necessary; the individual had to be posited as stranger in her
own world.
This leads to a somewhat different interpretation of the social-
constructive predicament than the one offered by Latour himself. It is not
that the Strong Programme lost its verve and courage when confronted
with the nal application of the symmetry principle, viz., when it had to
come to terms with the historicity of the distinction between subjects and
objects. It is, rather, that in spite of symmetry being perhaps their greatest
claim to fame, the commitment of the Programme’s adherents to this
principle—which all but embodies constructivism—was less than com-
plete to begin with. As long as the relations between social, individual
and Nature were assumed to be what they were, “constructivism” had to
be compromised, if it were to be “social.”17
One may be lead to conclude that there is, in fact, no real dilemma;
that the insistence of constructivists like Bloor (1999) to not use science’s
accounts of Nature in their own accounts of science reects only the in-
ability to fully incorporate their own constructive principles. In particular,
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17. One can read Latour’s arguments for favoring anthropology over sociology as pro-
ceeding along the same line. Cf. his 1993.
they seem to unwittingly share with all empiricists since Bacon the in-
stinctive conviction that knowledge cannot be both real and constructed, despite
Bloor’s excellent arguments why this conviction is supported by nothing
but instinct (1976, pp. 5…19).18 Of course, where their old rivals were
careful to steer clear of all idols—all human interventions—the con-
structivists opted to celebrate those interventions. But by actually shun-
ning science, by refusing to employ its results—their vehement avowal of
its method notwithstanding—they are in practice, if not in rhetoric, re-
fusing to accept its claim on truth. They show themselves to accept the
same empiricist exclusive disjunction: either science is real or it is con-
structed, but not both. Without that in-built suspicion of their own
constructivism, without this requirement to delineate a space for “the so-
cial,” so the claim would go, there would be no Latour’s dilemma; it
would not seem like we are prejudging the historical process of acquiring
knowledge about nature by applying our current knowledge of nature in
the historical account.
Like the previous suggestion, this resolution strikes one as unsatisfac-
tory. If the basic structures available for the historical account of science
remain unchanged, the complaints of traditional social constructivists
against Latour’s suggestions seem to remain valid, regardless of all philo-
sophical niceties: either knowledge is the outcome of the process or its
motor; either the agency is with the human inquirers or with the Nature
inquired; either science has a profane history of human interpretation or
a sacred one of Nature’s revelation. If one wishes to keep constructivism
but avoid social-idealism, to re-introduce realism but avoid Whigism, to
establish super-symmetry without dismantling symmetry, so it seems,
these basic narrative structures should be radically altered, and with them
the relations assumed between their main actors—Nature, society and
individual.
Latour attempts to do just this.
9. Latour’s Solution
Beyond Latour’s sometimes heavy metaphorics, which is at least partly
responsible for the vehemence in which he is opposed, lies a bold and sim-
ple solution: to assign historicity directly to things. Instead of attempting
to guarantee the temporal, contingent status of germs by pitting the his-
torically situated Pasteur against the eternally entrenched Nature, Latour
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18. Regrettably, in his (1999) Hacking appears to succumbs to this habit as well.
Though he says, on p. 68, that epistemological constructivism “is very different from
doubting the truth or applicability of any propositions widely held in the natural sci-
ences,” the whole tenor of his analysis of constructivism in general is as a type of
conspiration-exposing relativism.
suggests, we should afx the sign of time on germs’ own sleeve. The worry
was that, by letting scientic objects participate in shaping (the outcome
of the very historical process that brought about) their own existence and
character, we are giving in to the myth of their being a part of a never-
changing Nature awaiting discovery. But this is a misplaced worry, stem-
ming from the same dichotomy that Latour explicitly rejects. He does not
suggest a new distribution of credit—for germs or light rays—between
society on the one hand and nature on the other. Super symmetry means
that neither end is a primitive, originary source of agency, but rather that
both ends are idealized abstractions of the real things—germs and differ-
ently refrangible rays—which are both historically situated and “out
there.”
Germs, Latour teaches, do not have to remain passive in order to save
their contingency and historicity. Yes, they did help Pasteur in his dispute
with Pouchet—but they could not have done so before 1857. Until 1854
germs hardly existed, although in 1861, after Pasteur won the Académie’s
prize for his Memoire, they became his main allies. By then their existence
had stabilized enough, thanks, largely, to Pasteur’s deployment of his
experimental, instrumental, rhetorical, cultural and political skills. And,
indeed, Pouchet’s eggs can also claim credit for his courageous standing;
without them, he would have lost the dispute back in 1859. True, by
1864, when the Académie ruled in favor of Pasteur and against Pouchet,
they were no longer in a position to help—they were growing extinct. The
fabric of experimental, instrumental, rhetorical, cultural and political con-
nections upholding them was becoming undone. This was partly due, of
course, to the work of Pasteur.
So dare one say that when Pasteur was sick before 1854, it was due to
whatever mysterious reasons, but when Pouchet caught the u after 1864,
he was being infected by vicious microorganisms? Why not? One can of
course retort to the more intuitive idea that the young Pasteur was also
suffering from the long reach of his yet-to-be-discovered germs; some-
times we extend their efcacy into the much more remote past, as when
we apply tuberculosis to the mummy of Ramses II (Latour 2000, pp. 247…
251). But we would be better advised to remember that that is exactly
what we are doing, namely, extending and applying, and that this extension
and that application are not automatic. Science is most human, most con-
structed, when it makes its most general and furthest reaching claims; it is
there that it resorts to the most complex instruments, most heterogeneous
technologies, least rigorous mathematics
How would this approach adjudicate the dispute between Shapiro and
Schaffer? Did the Liège group lose their bout with Newton because of
their experimental incompetence or was this incompetence the outcome of
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Newton’s careful efforts to marginalize and discredit their claims? The an-
swer, if we follow Latour, is wholly dependent on the point in time about
which the question is asked. By 1678, and denitely after 1704, the Jesu-
its of Liège were simply incompetent. By then Nature has been shaped to
yield Newton’s results when properly observed. Similar claims can be
made concerning Venetian glass: by 1730 it was much too crude to allow
Nature to fully expose itself. Had Hooke and his interests in the colors of
thin lms won the day back in 1672, this greenish, veined glass might
have been necessary equipment for any optician, but by 1704 this was no
longer an option. Hooke was dead, and the success of Newton’s reecting
telescope back in 1672 set him on a track for the Principia, the Optics, the
presidency of the Royal Society and enough fame and prestige all over Eu-
rope to be calling all the shots in all scientic debates. Did Newton have a
hand in this change? Most denitely. But neither was he, nor the Royal
Society, nor the rest of the London-Cambridge-Liège axis, impervious to
the change that began in 1666 when he removed the screen to 20-some
feet from the symmetrically placed prism. The process which broke light
into primitive colored rays, each equipped with its own index of
irrefrangibility, had engulfed all: Nature, society and Newton himself.
10. Conclusions
It is one thing to sympathize with the historiographical and epistemo-
logical motivations that Latour discharges by suggesting that the real
things are hybrids of natural law and social order. It is a wholly different
matter to adopt this audacious suggestion. The neat solution of the
Shapiro-Schaffer dispute suggests that, from the historiographical point of
view, Latour’s totemism, his fusion of nature and society, may be a practi-
cal methodological approach, even if its successful application still re-
quires some further exercise (Latour’s most daring attempt in this direc-
tion—his aforementioned Aramis, is, to my judgment, only a partial
success). It is yet a much more difcult question whether it is also a viable
metaphysical position. Playing around with the subject-object dichotomy
is a dangerous game, and it remains to be seen how Latour is going to sur-
vive it. However, I would like to point out by way of conclusion that the
dangers he is facing do not come from any of the expected directions.
Perhaps the most expected one is the allegation of historicism. The
instinctive apprehension instigated while reading Latour is that his
totemism is nothing but reication of the historical process. In an attempt
to avoid naïve realism on the one hand and naïve sociologism on the other,
the feeling emerges, Latour falls into naïve historicism; not wanting to as-
sign either Nature or society the responsibility for the creation of things,
he assigns it to history.
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This is a false allegation. What saves Latour from becoming an SSK
Hegelian is not only his irony and light-hearted skepticism that dees
the self-righteous systematicity of old historicism. More signicant is
that his offer to assign historicity to things does not reconstitute history
as the ultimate substratum of necessity. Just the opposite: Latour’s
historization of natural things is an attempt to provide a space for the con-
tingency of human knowledge, without falling into the trap of burdening
the human knowing subject with more agency than it can or should bear.
Contingency, I argued above, is the most fundamental feature of
constructivism. It is its contingency that makes science historical; a devel-
opment within human history, rather than a gradual manifestation of rea-
son independent of this history. Thus constructivism, in general, is histor-
ical rather than historicist, and Latour’s totemism in particular accentuates
this point. The disputes between Newton and the Jesuits and between
Pasteur and Pouchet, Latour points out, could have just as well gone the
other way, and the destiny of rays and germs could have been completely
different.
If the charge of Hegelianism turned out to be fairly easy to fend off, one
may expect Latour to nd the challenge from the realist camp much more
devastating. In fact, from the realist point of view, there is one good reason
and one bad reason to object to Latour’s totemic metaphysics. The bad rea-
son is the seemingly more obvious one, namely, that by adding human
history to the make-up of natural things we are abrogating the rst princi-
ple of realism, viz.: “humankind confronts an objective world, something
almost entirely not of our making” (Wright 1986, p. 1). To the degree
that such a complaint reects a pious concern for the independence of the
“objective world” from human machinations, it is badly misdirected.
Latour’s main motivation, one should recall, is anti-idealist; he challenges
social constructivism to nd an aperture through which things can enter
into human history and “make a difference” (1999, p. 117, italics in origi-
nal)—not vice versa. Indeed, for that to be achieved without symmetry be-
ing compromised—without assuming that things control human history
by simply revealing themselves at their heart’s desire—we heed to have
subjects and objects share one causal structure. In relating human history
to natural history—in rejecting idealism—we indeed eschew the total in-
dependence of objects from subjects—things cannot be completely indif-
ferent to humans if they are to be causally connected—but this is a far cry
from subjecting things to human agency. Latour’s world is still “almost
entirely not of our making,” in spite of the utterly non-standard way in
which it is granted this independence. If anything, it is a more “objective
world” than usual, as the human part of this world appears less “of our
making” than we used to think.
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This argument will probably strike the realist as utterly unsatisfactory.
Latour’s way of assuring that the world is “not of our making” is too for-
eign to commonsense realism to be made palatable with one neat turn of
phrase. The intuitive rejection could probably be wrapped with a solid
counter-argument, but more interesting still would be to follow the light
it sheds on the intellectual instincts behind realism, especially in its
anti-skeptic mode. Since Latour does not subject the objective world to
the human mind, it appears that the aspect of his proposal that the realist
nds so troubling is rather the subjugation of the human mind to the ob-
jective world. This suggests the (somehow not completely surprising) pos-
sibility that realism was less interested in protecting the objective world
against the intervention of its human inhabitants than in preserving
human independence, or rather estrangement from that world. This is an
intriguing suggestion, partly because such estrangement pits realism
against its classic ally—materialism, the belief that everything, humans
included, is made of one basic substance—matter. There is no prima facie
reason why anti-materialist realism is not a tenable metaphysical position,
but it is probably not one that your run-of-the-mill realist would have
expected to nd himself holding.
This line of reasoning takes us beyond the scope of this paper. The
entanglement of humans and things, I claimed, was the obvious but mis-
taken reason for a realist to reject Latour’s ideas. The less obvious, but
much more difcult challenge to the realist wishing to adopt these ideas is
their incongruence with the principle with which we have started, viz.,
that science, though it is historical and contingent, is unique. There is
no outside perspective from which the objects of science can be viewed
and science’s account of them questioned.19 Yet that is exactly what Latour
seems to offer: a claim about the makeup of these objects, supported
by non-scientic arguments, which stands in complete opposition to
the claims made by science. The uniformity of laws of nature over time
and space is perhaps the most basic metaphysical cum methodological as-
sumption of science since the early seventeenth century, and it pervades all
of science’s theoretical and practical work. One may of course decide
whether to believe statements based on such assumptions or not, but one
cannot purport to be a realist, especially of the anti-representational sort,
if one chooses to believe science while rejecting the status it assigns its
objects.
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19. According to Michael Friedman (1999, esp. pp. 2…11), a very similar realization
was at the heart of the scientism of early logical positivism. As Friedman acknowledges,
his interpretation is not uncontested (fn. 3, p. 3), but if he is correct, it underscores the
similarity between logical positivism and social constructivismdiscussed above.
This is a very strong argument, but it does not entail, I think, the
defeat of constructivism a-la Latour. It is, rather, an aporia arrived at fol-
lowing a realist train of thought. Realism, as an attempt to bridge the
wall between knowing subject and known Nature, faces the constant em-
barrassment of nding itself fortifying that wall—the previous argument
was just another instance of this phenomenon. If realism were to provide
an alternative to oppositional metaphysics and its corresponding
visualistic epistemology, it would have to start “from the middle”—from
things as we know them. Alas, we know them historically, and as they are
part of our history, we are, ipso facto, part of theirs. There are no standing
grounds from which to view the relations between humans and reality
“from sideways on” (McDowell 1994, p. 34), but if the planets had a dif-
ferent effect on European society before and after Copernicus, if germs
effected French economy differently after Pasteur, and if we already fully
digested and assimilated the understanding that the difference is not
well-grasped by the simplistic notion of “discovery,” than we are forced to
look for this middle kingdom, where human history and natural history
meet. That this kingdom is not a place we feel comfortable in is not
Latour’s fault.
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